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The Armed Forces of the Republic of China have a large
number of motor vehicles for administrative use. The vehicles
were acquired from different sources in different years. In
general, the vehicles are old in age. The Armed Forces have
established a plant to manufacture vehicles for replacement.
Because the volume of production was low, the unit cost tended
to be high. The private industry motor vehicles were also
produced in an inefficient manner as compared to those pro-
duced in the United States. A logical alternative to reduce
the cost is to combine the total demand and try to seek more
efficient production. Unlike the private market, military
vehicle replacement decisions are centralized. The rate of
replacement largely determines the number of vehicles required
by the military. To help the decision maker to gain some in-
sight on the optimal lifetime of a motor vehicle, a stochastic
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Armed Forces of The Republic of China (AFRC) have a
laige number of motor vehicles for non-combat, administrative
use. The exact number of the vehicles is unknown until a local
investigation is made. In this study current data limitations
are of two types: security, and simple non-existence of a
sophisticated data base. Unfortunately, it is not possible
to separate these at this time. According to official sta-
tistics, the total number of the Armed Forces is around six
hundred thousand. [1] It is reasonable to believe that the
number of motor vehicles is quite large, since the U.S. Army,
on which the AFRC is modeled, has approximately one vehicle
per active duty soldier. [2] For the purpose of discussion
in this paper it could be assumed that the total number of
non-combat type vehicles is not less than 30,000 units.
The motor vehicles were acquired from different sources
through the years. Some were carried over from the mainland
and some were from the excess stock after different Asian area
wars. Many of the motor vehicles are very old. For some time,
the Armed Forces have had an extensive maintenance capability
on Taiwan to repair the worn-out vehicles or to cannibalize
them in order to maintain others. This capability is further
discussed in Chapter IV. Because the total number of vehicles
was still considered inadequate, the Armed Forces more recently
established a manufacturing plant to fabricate their own vehicles,
as discussed in Chapter IV.
8

How high the actual cost is for maintenance of the vehicles
has long been questioned. The manufacturing cost of vehicles
tends to be high because the volume of production was small
and the expensive plant facilities were not fully utilized.
Although hampered by lack of data, those questions are ad-
dressed in this paper at a policy level and with a simple
model
.
It is suggested that the defense economy is a part of the
national economy and must be addressed as part of the whole.
In this case, in relation to the national automobile industry.
For many years, the national economy boomed continuously. In
1954, the first manufacturer for motor vehicles was established
when the national income per capita was around US$100. By
1974, the national income per capita was up to US$700 and there
were six independent car manufacturers. However, all the private
manufacturers have had some difficulty. Every one of them
selected several models of vehicles to produce in trying to
dominate the local market. Consequently, the production output
of each model was very small. For most of them, the total
annual production was less than one thousand units. The result
was that the unit cost of the vehicle tended to be too high.
Many indications show that the need for motor vehicles is
expanding. The Armed Forces replacement needs are becoming
urgent now that the Asian area war no longer is a source.
Central Daily News, Taipei, 17 Dec 1974, p. 1. A recent
official investigation into the auto industry reported that
the utilization of plant facilities was about 30%.

The highway authorities reported that the total number of
civilian motor vehicles increased with an average annual
growth rate of 16.26% for fifteen years.
In 1973, the total number of civilian vehicles was
21,400,000 units. There is a prospective market for motor
vehicles since this is still less than one vehicle for 11.4
people
.
A logical solution to the problem seems to lie on the
supply side. How the private auto industries can achieve
the advantages of economies of scale and full utilization of
plant remains a national economic question.
The subject of this paper is to try to put a focus on
this potential accommodation between the sectors of demand
and of supply. The automobile industry needs advanced tech-
nology as well as intensive capitalization which, in turn, is
gradually built up by economic achievement. Therefore, some
aspects of economic development are important to this question
and will be addressed in the next chapter.
2 Sources: Ministry of Communication, Government of
Republic of China and the Taiwan Highway Bureau. The average
16.26% was computed base on the data from 1958 to 1972.
3 Population in Taiwan is 16,00 0,000.
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II . NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
A. GENERAL NATIONAL BACKGROUND
Taiwan as an island watches the gate to the free world in
the Pacific and is also one of the provinces of the Republic
of China. Back in 1903, China surrendered Taiwan and the
Pescadores to Japan after a war. During WWII the U.S. Air
Force bombarded the islands trying to destroy the Japanese
military as well as the industrial facilities on the islands.
In 1945, the war ended and Japan returned the islands to China
In 1949, Russian-supported Chinese communists took over the
mainland and the central government of the Republic moved to
Taiwan. By that time, every aspect of the island was in bad
shape
.
U.S. economic aid to the country started in 1951 through
the commission of the Agency for International Development
(AID). The aid was a vital transfusion which motivated the
economic activities in the island. The economic aid termin-
ated in 1965. It had turned out to be one of the most suc-
cessful cases of U.S. foreign aid. [3]
The private industries began to assemble motor vehicles
of various types with imported Japanese parts in 1952. Many
of them actually were very small machine shops. Technolog-
ically speaking, they were handcraft shops and had a very low
production rate of six to eight units or even less in one
month. Their products were primarily trucks for agriculture.
11

A real manufacturing plant equipped with modern facilities
for motor vehicles opened in 1954. And the Ministry of Econ-
omic Affairs (MOEA) set up a policy based on the "ratio of
self -manufactured parts' to regulate the industry. This rule
played an important part in the national economic growth, as
4
seen in the following sections.
B. ECONOMIC RECOVERY AFTER WWII
1. Before 1951
It was reported that on V-Day in 1945 when Taiwan was
retroceded to the Republic of China, about three-fourths of
the industrial facilities and two-thirds of the electric power
generating units were incapacitated, and only one-fourth of
the highways remained ser\r iceable . Harbors were ruined and
blocked. As a result, agricultural output dropped to forty-
five percent and industrial output to less than one-third of
their pre-war peaks. [4]
A painful process of rehabilitation and reconstruction
began right after the war. In the first two years, the recovery
of agricultural and industrial output was very slow. Unemploy-
ment of unskilled labor continued to increase.
In 1949, the central government of the Republic trans-
ferred its seat to Taiwan and brought along a large number of
mainlanders, mostly well educated. Many had administrative,
"Ratio of self-manufactured parts" means a fraction or
percent, calculated by cost, of the automobile parts which
must be made domestically. Periodically, MOEA sets up differ-
ent rates for various manufacturing products, such as TV sets,
refrigerators, computer assemblies, machine tools, etc.
1 ?

managerial, and technical knowledge and experience. The
impact of this change upon Taiwan's economy was enormous.
The economy started increasing. According to Prof.
M. H. Hsing [5], in 1953 the adjusted real income per capita
had reached the Japanese occupied prewar highest level. Some
figures from his book follow:
TABLE I
National Income Per Capita, Taiwan Area
(1935-1953) „„„ ...US$ Adjusted
Base Year Local Currency US$ to Base Year
Japanese
1935 Yen 139.5 40.1 40.1
(1935) (1935) (1935)
New Taiwan
1951 $3,911 85.39 38.10
(1964) (1964) (1935)
1952 $4,221 92.16 41.47
(1964) (1964) (1935)
1953 $4,334 94.63 42.58
(1964) (1964) (1935)
2 . U.S. Aid to Taiwan
With the arrival of U.S. aid, the powerful Economic
Stabilization Board was established in 1951. The often heard
phrase "developing agriculture by virtue of industry and
fostering industry by virtue of agriculture" was not merely
a political slogan but a guideline of action for the govern-
ment. As a matter of fact, systematic development of agri-
culture began earlier under the careful planning of the Sino-
American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR)
.
The United States' aid program had played a decisive
role in Taiwan's economic development and industrial development
13

Its immediate objective was to stabilize the inflation and
then shift its emphasis from economic stabilization to econ-
omic development.
According to Professor M. H. Hsing [5], taking all
forms of U.S. aid together the total delivered was US$1370.2
million from 1951 to 1965.
From a no-aid growth model constructed for Taiwan
based on a number of simplifying assumptions, Professor
N. H. Jacoby [3] drew the following startling assumptions:
"Aid more than doubled the annual rate of growth of Taiwan's
GNP, quadrupled the annual rate of growth of per capita GNP,
and cut thirty years from the time needed to attain 1964
living standards. Without aid, it was calculated that the
GNP would have grown only 3.5 per cent a year until 1983,
and in 1964 would have been only about 58 per cent of the
actual amount. Actual per capita GNP of 1964 would not
have been produced until 1995."
It was somewhat difficult to pass judgement on the
above conclusion because the validity depends on the assump-
tions underlying the models that Prof. Jacoby used. Never-
theless, it was a very successful economic achievement.
3 . To Achieve More Prosperity
The aid program terminated in 1965. Apart from
directing the use of U.S. aid, the Chinese Government has
adapted a wide spectrum of policies for economic development
and national industrialization. The major policies could be
conveniently grouped into six categories. They were:
a. Direct control over industry;
b. Foreign trade and exchange control;
c. Tariff protection;
d. Export promotion;
e. Encouragement of investment;
f. Provision of finance.
14

Since 1953 a four-year economic development plan comes
out every four years. The Chinese government has implemented
a series of consecutive four-year economic plans for further
prosperity. During the first and second planning periods,
targets were the development of the industries of import sub-
stitution. After the third and fourth planning periods, the
volume of exports expanded enormously. Heavy industries are
emphasized in the sixth four-year plan, launched in 1973 and
to be accomplished by 1976.
The continuously increasing achievement of economic
development cultivated an appropriate climate for the auto-
motive industries to sprout and to flourish. The climate is
better described by figures which give the national income
per capita adjusted to 1966 base value. (See Table II).
C. GROWTH OF DOMESTIC AUTO INDUSTRY
1 . The Yue-Loong Motor Company Period
In 1952 the Taiwan adjusted national income per capita
was around US$106. There were many small machine shops which
started to assemble different kinds of trucks of various sizes
Most of them were three-wheelers with a small diesel engine
installed which originally was designed for fishing boat use.
Owing to their poor stability, three-wheelers were banned.
The manufacturers who wanted to stay in the business had two
Source: Directorate-General of Budgets, Accounts and
Statistics (DGBAS) , Executive Yuan, Government of the Republic
of China. At 1966 prices, the 1952 adjusted real income per
capita was NT$4,277 and the official exchange rate to US$ in
the cited year was NT$40.10 to US$1.00. 4277 -y 40.1 = 106.6.
15
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ways to go, either to two-wheel or four-wheel. For the former
case, some manufacturers acquired foreign technical cooperation
to make motorcycles.
Because of the influx of foreign technology, the
government set up a "ratio of self -manufacture" for all manu-
facturing industries to control the specific industry. Accord-
ing to the ratio, some parts must be made domestically. Every
year the government reviewed the situation and readjusted the
ratio accordingly in order to bring up a broader development
of industry.
The motorcycle industries boomed until the government
changed its policies in response to social pressures against
motorcycles and for traffic safety considerations.
The Yue-Loong Motor Company made the first jeep under
a license authorized by Willys of USA in 1957. The next year
Yue-Loong contracted with Nissan Motor Co. of Japan to assemble
Nissan's "Blue Bird," a 1,100 cc four-door sedan, in Taiwan.
At first, Yue-Loong agreed to increase the percentage of
domestic made parts by ten percent annually. But later in
1962, the Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) revised the
ratio for auto industry to sixty percent as a ceiling for the
time being.
In 1964, Yue-Loong announced that the annual produc-
tion of "Blue Bird" was one thousand units while the total
assets of the company were one thousand million dollars (in
New-Taiwan currency), which was equivalent to US$25 million
in that year. It employed two thousand workers.
17

It is a general belief that a sound automobile
industry is a doorway to overall industrialization of an
economy. The automobile industry is highly intensive in
capital, in precision technique, and in modern management
skill. Yue-Loong started the business almost in a semi-
handicraft way. It had a hard time. However, it dominated
the domestic market for several years. With the continuous
upward climb of real income per capita reaching US$217.00,
other manufacturers started to join in.
Another manufacturer, San-Fu Industrial Company,
registered a capital of NT$12 million in 1964 and produced
small trucks and small sedans which Japanese Subaru licensed.
At the end of 1969, its total assets were estimated to be
NT$60 million. San-Fu is the smallest of the four auto manu-
facturers in operation, yet it is the only one whose sales of
1970 exceeded those of 1969.
San-Yang Company is a manufacturer licensed by Honda
of Japan. In late 1968 it shifted its business from motorcycle
to automobiles and reorganized with total assets of NT$800
million. The company announced that it would specialize in
the production of heavy duty trucks.
Lio-Ho Industry Corporation registered in 1965 having
a cooperation contract with Japanese Toyota. But the actual
production began in 1971 with 6,000 units of Corona annually.
In 1973, after Lio-Ho terminated the cooperation with Toyota,
Ford Motor Company of USA invested in the corporation and
reorganized it.
Source: PGBAS op. cit. For the year 1968, and calculated
as the footnote on P.
18

There were others in the industry, but Yue-Loong
remained the most important one during this period.
2 . The Ford-Lioho Motor Company Period
In 1973, Ford Motor Company of USA acquired seventy
percent of the old Lio-Ho shares in an amount of US$6,300,000.
They reorganized the corporation into Ford-Lioho Motor Company.
Ford Company also announced a first-stage ten-year development
plan for the newly established subsidiary. The plan consists
of four phases: in phase I, from 1973 to 1974, Ford would invest
US$6,900,000 for plant and machine tools; in phase II, from
1975 to 1977, another US$6,200,000; in phase III, from 1978
to 1980, US$10,040,000 more; and the last phase ends in 1985,
with an investment of US$16,400,000. The total amount of the
ten-year plan sums up to thirty-nine million in US dollars. [6].
Ford-Lioho plans to specialize in sedan production.
According to the plan, there will be four different types of
cars produced. They are: Fiera, a special design for Asia,
of 1,100 cubic centimeters' (cc) displacement, with annual
production of 4,000 units; Escort, 1,300 cc, annual production
of 1,600 units; Cortina, 1,600 cc, 2,900 units; and the luxury
line of Fairmont and Walnut with an engine displacement bigger
than 5,000 cc, for export.
According to a newspaper, Ford-Lioho introduced its
7
first Cortina to the Taiwan market several months ago.
7 Central Daily News , Taipei, International Edition, some
day in June or July 1974.
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3 . The Satellites of the Auto Industry
A modern motor vehicle consists of more than one
hundred major assemblies which are in turn made up of many
parts of different materials. The whole process requires a
huge diversification of production. Even in many highly-
developed countries, such as USA, Japan, or Germany, many car
manufacturers merely assemble a car using the parts provided
by contracted vendors. It is a general principle that the
three "S's" (specialization, simplification, standardization)
lead to economical production. In other words, it would be
economical to specialize the technique as well as to divide
the labor for larger volume of output with less product
varieties
.
The name, Satellite Industries, is used by the Ministry
of Economic Affairs (MOEA) , for those who make parts and con-
tribute them to a major industry. The satellites still have
their own line of distribution, for instance, a rubber tire
company not only is a vendor to a car manufacturer but also
accepts its own export orders
.
With the appearance of car manufacturers came many
more parts manufacturers. According to a survey made by the
Bureau of Industry, MOEA [7], at the end of 1971 there were
31 machinery factories making qualified automobile parts,
such as, hydraulic cylinders, pistons, piston rings, crank-




Playing a support role to different manufacturing
industries, there are the primary industries, namely, the
iron foundries that make the castings and the rolling plants
that make beams and sheets.
Industries of glass, rubber, and plastic are also major
satellites to the auto industry. In Taiwan, these three in-
dustries were always at the top of the list of profit makers,
even before the auto industry existed. For a long time, all
of their products had a very good quality level as well as a
very good reputation in the international market. These
industries had no difficulty in supporting the developing auto
industry. This is in contrast to the situation in some other
countries where auto industry development was slowed by lack
of supporting industries.
D. AUTO INDUSTRY ANALYSIS
For many years the price and low quality of domestic cars
has been criticized throughout the country. It seems that the
one way to reduce production cost and assure better quality is
to try to acquire the advantage of economies of scale. Large
scale streamlined manufacturing processes requiring more and
better use of capital are needed. Apparently this is the Ford
Motor Company's intent with its subsidiary Ford-Lioho in
Taiwan.
o
Taiwan is not a very big territory. It is hard to justify
several dozen different types of cars on its 17,000 kilometers
The island is leaf- shaped, 4 50 km from north to south,
150 km from east to west in the middle part.
2]

of highway. The production of many diverse models, each with
low volume of output, has led to inefficient production.
The author would assume that in the United States the
production of motor vehicles, after a period of longer than
sixty years, has already approached an efficient stage of
production. In order to have an indicator to support the
assumptions of current inefficiency in the Taiwan auto industry
noted above, a ratio of "total assets per car output" was
computed for motor vehicle manufacturers in the United States.
Due to the incompleteness of data resources, it was a somewhat
rough comparison.
Table III shows the total assets and number of cars sold
per year for Ford and General Motors in the USA. A ratio of
total assets per output was computed by year. The mean value
of the eight data points was found to be 2.2445. In a sense,
there were US$2,244 of total assets value per car output for




Total Assets Per Car Output in the United States
Year: 1969 1970 1971 1972
Ford
Total assets in
million US$ 9,199 9,904 10,509 11,634
Cars sold in
thousand units 4,944 4,862 5,024 5,698
RATIO 1.860 2.037 2.091 2.041
General Motors
Total assets in
million US$ 14,820 14,174 11,048 12,145
Cars sold in
thousand units 5,259 4,609 5,767 5,740
RATIO 2.818 3.075 1.916 2.116
Applying the same criterion to Yue-Loong, for the year
1964 the ratio appeared to be 25.0, which was eleven times
the American average. Yue-Loong' s 1964 data was the only
available data for making a comparison to the United States
average; admittedly, it is a crude comparison. In 1964, Yue-
Loong ' s total assets were US$25 million while the planned
annual production was 1,000 units of "Blue Bird.". However,
according to Taiwan Highway Bureau's report in the year 1964
domestically manufactured vehicles were 1,797 units. Assuming
that all 1,797 units were made by Yue-Loong because the other
manufacturers joined in the business after 1967, the ratio
turned is 13.9. This is 6.2 times the Americans' average,
still a sizeable difference.
23

A similar comparison was made using manpower ratios.
This is shown in Table IV, which can be compiled according
to relevant annual reports. Both tables show relatively
consistent results. Applying the same procedure to Yue-
Loong' s 1964 situation turned out as the number 24, which
reveal that for one car output Yue-Loong needed 24 times more
manpower than Ford. For every one manpower input, Ford made
24 times more cars than Yue-Loong.
TABLE IV
Manpower Productivity in the United States
1969 1970 1971 1972 Average
Workers employed
by Ford in USA 244,840 229,404 225,304 232,869
Men/car output .0495 .0472 .0448 .0409 .0456
Cars/man input 20.19 21.19 22.29 24.47 21.92
Yue-Loong compared to Ford:
Cars manufactured - 1,797
Workers employed - 2,000
Men/car output - 1.113 1.113
Cars/man input - .899
1.113 4- .0456 = 24.4
21.92 - .899 = 24.4
24

The author believes the ratios are an indication of
different economic structures, i.e., sizes rather than a
consequence of totally disorganized inefficiency. On the
average, the hourly wage rate for a U.S. auto worker is around
$4 to $5 and the national income per capita is almost US$4000.
In the Republic of China the national income per capita is
US$700 and the auto worker is paid by month or day. His daily
wage rate is around NT$500, equivalent to US$13.
The lower wage rate and the import tax on foreign-made
automobiles allow the domestic auto makers to compete with
foreign-made automobiles. However, a large production rate
should result in better utilization of capital and labor,
thus lowering cost and thereby expanding demand.
25

III. PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
In Taiwan the demand for motor vehicles is substantial.
The Armed Forces have a large potential demand, as mentioned
earlier. In the open market the booming economy created a
demand for more cars. In Table V the growth of motor vehicle
production can be seen.
TABLE V
The Growth of Motor Vehicle Production in Taiwan
Year: 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Cars made 7,670 10,890 7,871 10,917 19,618
Increased by
Percent 9 41.9 -27.7 38.7 79.7
Domestically-made cars have long been criticized for
their high cost. Probably the most important problem to be
solved would be the reasonable reduction of the production
cost. Some suggestions for consideration are:
(1) Reduce the various types of cars to fewer standard
models
.
(2) Encourage the individual manufacturers to merge so
that they could pool their capital to utilize modern mass
production techniques.
(3) Introduce professional management systems to acquire
the higher efficiency of production.
(4) Further specialize the production of standard parts.
There are some specialized manufacturers already, e.g.,
makers of radiator springs, pistons, piston rings, etc.
q
Starting from 1970, import of foreign-made cars was
allowed. There was a major impact only in the first year.
26

Further specialization, especially in automatic production
facilities and advanced techniques, remain to be introduced.
(5) Explore the potential industries which are vertically
related to the auto industry for more efficient production.
With regars to item (1) , the standard models should be
designed for potential use. The author strongly feels this
to be a very important policy to apply to today's Taiwan
situation in which the natural resources are very limited.
For many years most of the vehicle manufacturers produced
motor vehicles according only to the contracted license to
make the same car designed in a foreign environment for their
specific demand. None of the manufacturers designed a vehicle
according to the domestic environment. The Farmer's Associa-
tion in Taiwan already has made the claim that the farmer
working in Taiwan's fields needs a car fit to his requirement.
[8]
Probably the main reason for the diversification of car
types is the competitive pressure from the market. The author
had an intuition that most people were seeking economy cars.
The Volkswagon Beetle, which sells well in Taiwan, is a good
example. An alternative is to select a few good designs and
put them into mass production in order to achieve the advan-
tage of cheaper unit cost.
In Taiwan, where the highways in general are good, a truck
good for commercial use is also good for administrative use.
A jeep good for the Armed Forces is also good for forest
police. The author emphasizes that many small individual
demands could be pooled into a large demand which would make
27

possible mass production of a standard vehicle. It would be
even better if the Armed Forces would purchase mass produced
vehicles from private auto manufacturers.
The above suggestions are somewhat related to each other.
For a highly automatic plant for mass production, intensive
capital as well as professional management systems are es-
sential. These were mentioned in points (2) and (3) respec-
tively.
Referring to the last point, there are actually many
aspects which could be explored. For instance, the plastic
industry in Taiwan has been the most profitable for years.
If the plastic industry would invest some of its research
and development capability on potential usage of plastic for
motor vehicles, it might reduce the cost of a vehicle in the
future. Downward vertical integration of auto industry could
lead to car rental services, which in turn might stimulate
larger demand for cars. A full development of the auto in-
dustry could lead to regional international cooperation.
For instance, in Asia, Japan is highly developed while there
are many countries in the "take-off" stage of development.
Cooperation based on mutual benefit is feasible. For instance,
each country manufactures certain auto parts with the advanced
countries making the complex parts and the others concentrating
on labor-intensive parts. The countries exchange the parts
and every country, or group of countries, assemble the cars
for their own use. This might be an economical way to acquire
motor vehicles. However, further development is far beyond
the scope of this paper.
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IV. A MATHEMATICAL MODEL TO HELP DECISION MAKING
A. CURRENT AFRC VEHICLE POLICY
Almost twenty years ago the Armed Forves of the Republic
of China (AFRC) established several maintenance shops spread
over the island in order to keep the vehicles in good shape.
A few years later a large base depot for overhauling as well
as cannibalization of vehicles was installed. Then, five or
six years ago another brand new automobile manufacturing plant
was set up to fabricate vehicles for replacement, as mentioned
previously. The author believes that the number of vehicles
needed to be replaced outnumbers those the manufacturing plant
could supply. The output volume of the manufacturing plant is
low, say, less than 1,000 units per year. The limitations arise
from many reasons, for instance, lack of working capital, lack
of cost consciousness, lack of skillful workers and lack of
entrepreneurship
.
If all the AFRC's demand could be added to civilian demand
to form a unique national demand it would help the market to
expand. This might allow the producers to adopt the advantages
of the economies of scale.
The AFRC demand is primarily for replacement. The nucleus
of a replacement problem is the cost incurred. According to
engineering economic theory of replacement, a piece of machinery
should not be used as long as the marginal cost is below the
average cost. When marginal cost exceeds average cost, a
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replacement should take place. [9] In practice, the next year's
operating cost, including maintenance cost, is compared to the
annualized investment cost plus average operating cost of a
new vehicle.
It seems that AFRC does not have a significant replacement
policy for its administrative vehicles. It does not have data
on each vehicle's costs. On the other hand, when the number
of vehicles is large, the general engineering economy type
technique is hard to apply on a vehicle-by-vehicle basis. A
general policy on replacement by age or usage is needed.
For the cost of keeping all vehicles usable, the total
expenditure for the maintenance facilities should also be in-
cluded. In other words, the maintenance cost of a vehicle is
not only the materials replaced and labor applied, but also
the opportunity cost of doing something else. For example,
at present it is necessary for military mechanics to manufacture
repair parts for old vehicles. The cost to their time is hidden
in the fixed cost of the military units. The author would con-
tend that two procedures should be implemented. First, a
thorough study should be made of the total current expenses
for the upkeep of cars. The actual money spent, no matter
what budget category it is from, should be stressed. The
investigation might turn up something dramatic in the way of
high maintenance costs. Secondly, let AFRC buy a group of
standard commercial trucks and set up a unique record system
to trace all the expenses that were incurred; applying the
standard engineering economic replacement rule will generate
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observation of the lifetime of the vehicles. After the data
is collected, some statistical analysis techniques could be
applied, as seen in the next section, and some knowledge of
the cost behavior of the vehicles could be deduced. Probably
the two procedures could be performed simultaneously.
Military standards are difficult to achieve by the rather
primitive private industry. The cars used by AFRC were highly
sophisticated and need advanced technical capability to assure
the quality requirements. The author strongly supports the
requirement for a combat vehicle that is engaging in a dog-
fight over an unexpected terrain. However, the military does
not need a truck with water-tight, super-tough chassis, high
traction, equipped with complicated multi-fuel engine, to face
the blinking traffic lights on a well paved asphalt highway.
It would be better to design a model according to the require-
ment .
If it is decided to depend upon private industry for the
AFRC ' s vehicle demand, the AFRC could turn its vehicle manu-
facturing capability to production of combat vehicles and to
its Research and Development use. For instance, it could be
used to develop prototype vehicles to meet future missions.
It could provide the capability for pilot production, to collect
cost data and apply some systems analysis techniques to study
the cost behavior. For instance, many still do not believe
that the production cost of some manufacturing items will go
down when the production volume increases. The learning curve
theory, for example, as related to specific working conditions
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could be validated by production experimentation. The Research
and Development (R$D) facility could make and supply to the
industry the production jigs and fixtures, the measuring tools
and gauges for on-line inspection or for product quality assur-
ance. This is simply an application of the principle of
division of labor. The author is convinced that this is the
principle that can help the production cost of a vehicle to
come down and that the national technological level can be
escalated. These relationships between private and military
facilities would be novel and perhaps require considerable
experimentation.
B. A SUGGESTED MATHEMATICAL MODEL
1 . Stochastic Aspect
As stressed in the above section, the cost behavior
of vehicles and life-cycle factors should be observed before
any decision for replacement policy could be made. A model
for minimization of average lifetime cost of a vehicle is
proposed in the next paragraph. This model leads to a general
policy on vehicle lifetime. The advantage of a policy is the
generality of association. As stated in the title of this
paper, the focus is not for a single vehicle but rather for
a group. For a relatively large number of vehicles with the
cost in a long run perspect ive , a mode] with stochastic aspect





2 . A Model for Minimization of Long-Run Average Cost
Suppose that the lifetime (years) of a motor vehicle
is a continuous random variable, t, having a probability density
function (pdf)
,
f (t) , and a cumulative distribution function
(cdf), F(t),
where
/~f(t)dt = F(t) (1)
As a matter of fact, the lifetime of a motor vehicle
starts at t = 0, and the lifetime is rarely longer than 20
years; therefore equation (1) can be rewritten as
20
/ f(t)dt = F(t) (2)
Arbitrarily on the time scale, set a point T such
that 0<T<20. And assume there is a policy that as soon as a
vehicle either breaks down or reaches the age of T years a




The object of this study is to find the optimal policy
for vehicle retirement which would minimize the lifetime average
cost of a motor vehicle.
(1) Total lifetime cost for one vehicle
K purchase expenditure, a single payment made at t=0;
c(t) operational and maintenance cost, is a continuous
function of time and could be assumed to have a
general form of
eft) « c + c t + c t 2 , for t>V J O 1 2 ' —




s(t) the salvage value, which decreases as a function
of time. It is a reduction to the cost so it is
subtracted. It could be assumed to have a general
form of
s(t) = s - s t - s t 2 , for t >v J O 1 2 ' —
s. is resale value coefficient.
l
h(t) extra operational cost above T, a continuous function
of time. When a vehicle's age is up to point T and
it does not break down, it will be kept in use but
not any maintenance will be applied. It could be
assumed to have a general form of
h(t) = hQ + hj t + l^ t
2
, t>T
h- is extra operational cost coefficient.
Now, let random variable t be the lifetime of a motor
vehicle for an arbitrary lifetime cycle, then the incurred
costs during the cycle will be





Let total cost be denoted by TC(t) , then the expec-
tation of total cost incurred over one lifetime cycle for one
vehicle is
20




1 [K + c(t)-s(t)]f(t)dt + /
T
[K + h(t)]f(t)dt
T 20 T 20
= / Kf(t)dt+/ Kf(t)dt+/
o
[c(t) -s(t)]f (t)dt+/ h(t)f(t)dt
T 20





(2) Length of lifetime, L



















= f] tf(t)dt + T[1-F(T)] (4)
(3) Average cost per lifetime
Divide equation (3) by equation (4) which gives the
long-run average cost per unit of time. It is




(4) Assume that the lifetime of motor vehicles are found to
be uniformly distributed over (a,b), then f(t) = l/(b-a) and
F(t) = t/(b-a). For simplicity, let b-a = d, then f(t) = 1/d
and F(t) = t/d. Substituting into equation (5) to yield a
general formula for long-run average cost for uniformly
distributed lifetime, let it be denoted by G (t)
G (t) =
u v J
K + /Jrc(t)-s(t)J idt + /!,° h(t) Idt
/
T
t -dt + Tfl-T/d]
o a l /
j
(6)
Note: For the case of uniform distribution, the range is
limited by b-a, so the predetermined T must lie in this range,




Example: Suppose that the lifetime of a vehicle was found to
be uniformly distributed over (0,12) years and the purchase
cost, K = $50 (in 10,000), operational and maintenance cost
c(t), salvage value s(t), and the overtime extra operational
cost h(t) all have a function of time, respectively.
c(t) = 3.5 + 8. 7t





50 + ~f (3.5+8.7t-36+3-2t)dt + yy / T 5.5tdt
G (t) = if-5 1?-!u
tt/ tdt + T(l - T 2 /12)12 o v J
6 .4T 2 - 65T + 3400
24T - T 2
Taking first derivative of G (t)
,
G'm = (24T - T 2 )(12.8T - 65) - (6.4T 2 - 65T + 3400) (24
U (24T - T 2 ) 2
88 .6T 2 + 6800T - 81600 (n ,= ( 7 j
576T 2 - 48T + T 4
Setting equation (7) equal to zero to solve T, i.e.,
88 .6T 2 + 6800T - 81600 =
or
T 2 + 76.75T - 920.99 =
.
T =
-76 75 + /(76.75) + 4(92"0.99)
2
= 10.55 (years)
Next, to verify that T = 10.55, minimize the value of G (t)
,
taking second derivative, from equation (7),
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G"(t) = (576T 2 - 48T 3 + T")(177.2T - 6800) - (88.6T 2 + 6800T - 81600)
(576T 2 - 48T 3
(1152T - 144T 2 + 4T 3 )
+ 4T U
-177. 2T 5 - 16147. 2T" - 979200T 3 - 15667200T 2 + 94003200T
(576T 2 - 48T 3 + T k ) 2
G"(10.55) = -177. 2(10. 55) 5 - 16147.2(10.55)"- 979200 (10 . 55) 3
(576T 2 - 48T 3
-15667200(10. 55) 2 + 94003200(10.55)
+ T") 2
1745.6865
(576(10. 55) 2 - 48(10. 55) 3 - (10. 55) 1*) 2
because the enumerator after squaring is always positive.
Therefore the value of G"(10.55) is also positive; in other
words, T = 10.55 minimize G (10.55).
' u^ J
(5) Assume that the lifetime of a motor vehicle is found to
be exponentially distributed with a mean value of (years)
,
then f (t) = =-e A L
,
t > 0, and F(t) = f f (x)dx = 1 - e A L ;
A O
substituting into equation (5) to yield a general formula for
long run average cost for exponentially distributed lifetime,
let it be denoted by G ft) , then , n
T e i It 20 1 I
K + /' [c(t) - s(t)] ^ e r dt + L h(t)|e Adt
r ft~\ = - . ^ t ^








In the thirty years after WWII, Taiwan's situation progressed
from unstable and bewildered to a well developed economic society
with a national income per capita of US$700, highest, excluding
Japan, in the Southeast Asia area.
During the developing stage, any economic society experiences
various paradoxical situations. Taiwan's auto industry evolved
from a handicraft industry to a modern assembly- line production
industry in recent years as the domestic booming economy created
a potential demand for more cars. The problem with the situation
is that the unit cost of a vehicle has tended to be too high.
A logical solution to the problem is to merge the military demand
and civilian demand in order to produce a more efficient quantity
production of vehicles. The AFRC has many problems to be solved.
The replacement of administrative vehicles is one which appears
not to have been studied thoroughly. In this paper the author
stresses a systematic approach to the problem rather than the
strict application of a mathematical model.
Furthermore, the suggested replacement policy could also
be applied to other transportation organizations. For example,
the Taiwan Provincial Bureau of Highways and the Taipei City
Bus Systems, both of them operate several thousand passenger
buses, and some other private transportation companies; all
of them have had experience with the confusion of the replace-
ment problem for years.
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For the model addressed above, the distribution of lifetime
of vehicles must be observed as well as the cost incurred col-
lected and studied before applying the model. General formulae
for the uniformly and exponentially distributed lifetime were
derived. Different types of lifetime distribution could also
be derived, using the same procedures.
The author eagerly hopes that a validation or modification
of the model can be done after some real world data is collected
in the future.
When data is available, comparison between the model in this
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